Legal Analysis and Terminology by Corbin, Arthur
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Every student of the law must be equipped with certain fundamental
concepts and with certain terms in which to express them. Let him
read the federal Constitution or the opinion of any court or any legal
treatise, or let him listen to the lecture of any law professor, and every
sentence will be likely to bristle with rights and duties, powers, privi-
leges, liabilities, and immunities. He will gradually realize also that
these terms are frequently used loosely, each term often being used
to express several distinct concepts, and he will find that our diction-
aries merely record this wide and variable usage and aid little toward
the clear expression essential to exact reasoning.
No doubt the beginner cannot be made to realize at once the dis-
advantages attendant upon variableness of terms and uncertainty of
concept. But it is quite possible at the very outset to master a number
of fundamental legal concepts and to acquire a single definite meaning
for each of the terms used to express them. With such simple con-
cepts and definite phraseology the student can more easily analyze
a complex problem, arrive at a correct solution, and explain it clearly
to others., He can thus be led to avoid much unnecessary obscurity
and difficulty. As his experience increases he must test for himself
the accuracy and usefulness of the analysis and terminology. The
following definitions are offered, chiefly for the benefit of beginning
students of the law, in order to -assist in establishing an exact termi-
nology and a definiteness and accuracy of mental concept. These
definitions are in large part based upon the articles of Professor
Wesley N. Hohfeld, referred to below.
I. FACT: This is a world of facts. Physical existence and physical
relations are facts. Our mental processes are facts. The existence
of any legal relation is a fact. All changes and variations are facts.
Facts include acts and events.
II. AcT: An act- is one of that class of facts manifest to the senses
that consists of voluntary physical movements (muscular contractions
that are willed) of human beings. A forbearance is a consciously
willed absence of physical movement. Animals other than men can
act or forbear, but they do not become parties to a legal relation.
III. EVENT: Any change in the existing totality of facts, including
the acts of human beings.
Prepared with the critical assistance of other members of the Yale Law
Faculty.
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IV. OPERATIVE FAcT: Any fact the existence or occurrence of
which will cause new legal relations between persons. A clear dis-
tinction should always be observed between the physical phenomena
and the legal relations consequent thereon. The former are in the
world of the senses, the latter are intellectual conceptions. Operative
facts have also been described as "investitive," "constitutive," "causal,"
and "dispositive." The "extinguishment" of a legal relation is neces-
sarily the creation of a new one.
V. EVIDENTIAL FAcT: Any fact the existence or occurrence of
which tends to prove the existence of some other fact. For example,
a footprint on the sand is.a fact from which we may infer the recent
presence of a man.
Evidential facts may themselves be operative as well, but need not be.
For example, if A strikes B this fact often creates a right to damages
and at the same time it is evidence (not coriclusive) of an intent in A's
mind.
VI. MATERIAL FAcT: A fact is material when it is either operative
or evidential.
VII. PHYSICAL RELATION: A relation perceivable by the senses,
between two physical objects. This would include relations of space,
time, weight, color, density, and the like.
VIII. LEGAL RELATION: A law is a rule concerning human conduct,
established by those agents of an organized society who have legislative
power.2 When a rule of law has been reduced to words it is a state-
ment of the legal effect of operative facts; i. e. it is a statement that
certain facts will normally be followed by certain immediate or remote
consequences in the form of action or non-action by the judicial and
executive agents of society. Whenever any such operative facts exist
the persons who will be affected by the stated consequences are said
to have a legal relation each to the other. When we state that some
particular legal relation exists we are impliedly asserting the existence
of certain facts, and we are expressing our present mental concept of
the societal consequences that will normally follow in the future. A
statement that a legal relation exists between A and B is a prediction
as to what society, acting through its courts or executive agents, will
do or not do for one and against the other.3 If A invades B's house,
we are able to predict that the police will eject A, that a court will
give judgment for damages, and that the sheriff will levy execution.
These agents may be a king, a council, a court, a legislature composed of a
few representatives, or the entire mass of voters.
'It may be equally important to be able to predict the conduct of other persons
in purely private affairs or to predict other events, but this has nothing to do
with law. E. g. Will a structure withstand a go-mile wind? Will John propose
to Priscilla? At what price will shares sell next week? Will the barking dog
bite? What will the weather be?
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LEGAL ANALYSIS AND TERMINOLOGY
We say that B had a right that A should not intrude and that A had a
duty to stay out. But if B had invited A to enter, we know that those
results would not occur. In such case we say that B had no right that
A should stay out and that A had the privilege of entering.
The term "legal relation" should always be used with reference to
two persons, neither more nor less. Dne does not have a legal relation
to himself. Nor does one have a legal relation with two others; he
has separate legal relations with each. A so-called legal relation to
the State or to a corporation may always be reduced to many legal
relations with the individuals composing the State or the corporation,
even though for convenient discussion they may be grouped. There
can be no such thing as a legal relation between a person and a thing.
The relation of A to his house is a physical relation; but A has many
legal relations to other persons with respect to his house.
Furthermore, the legal relations of any two persons are frequently
numerous and complex, and it is of great service to analyze them into
their simplest forms. Such terms of the law as "contract," 
"trust,"
"property" and "marriage" do not represent a single legal relation;
they describe and represent complex and variable aggregates of legal
relations. For clear thinking and for just and correct decision it is
necessary to analyze these complex concepts into their simpler and
invariable elements.
What then are these simple elements? Before attempting any
formal definitions, they may first be indicated in a popular way.
Assuming that we wish to determine the legal relations of A and B,
we may ask ourselves the following questions:
(i) What may A (or B) do, without societal penalty assessed for
the benefit of the other?
(2) What must A (or B) do, under threat of societal penalty
assessed for the benefit of the other?
(3) What can A (or B) do, so as to change the existing legal rela-
tions of the other? (This has no reference to mere physical power.)
If we determine that A may conduct himself in a certain way he has
a privilege with respect to B, and B has no-right that A shall not so
conduct himself.
If we determine that A must conduct himself in a certain manner
he has a duty to B, and B has a right against A.
If we determine that by his own voluntary act A can change B's
legal relations with A (or with X), A has a legal power and B has a
liability.
If we determine that A cannot by his own voluntary act change the
legal relations of B, then A has a disability and B has an immunity.
Having isolated these definite concepts and chosen these specific
terms with which, Jo express them-all being found in the actual
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decisions and usage of the courts--Professor Wesley N. Hohfeld5
then arranged them in the following pairs of opposites and correlatives:
O right privilege power immunity
no-right duty disability liability
o right privilege power immunityCorrelatives duty no-right liability disability
Each pair of correlatives must always exist together; when some
person (A) has one of the pair, another person (B) necessarily has the
other. One of the terms expresses the relation of A to B; the other
term expresses the relation of B to A.
No pair of opposites can exist together. That is, when a person has
a right, he cannot have a no-right with respect to the same subject
matter and the same person. When he has a privilege, he cannot have
a duty.
The following gr6uping of terms may be useful:
May ............. permission ................. privilege-no-right
Must (may not).. compulsion ................ right-duty
Can ............ danger or possibility power-liability
(of new relations)
Cannot .......... safety (from new relations). immunity-disability
Observe that when we assert that some fact or group of facts will
operate to create a particular legal relation we are stating a rule of
law. The mere statement that a certain legal relation exists is a
statement of fact. Thus: (a) A owes B $Ioo.-statement of fact.
(b) C owns Blackacre-statement of fact. (c) An offer creates a
power in the offeree-rule of law. (d) The delivery of a deed conveys
title to land-rule of law. (e) The delivery of a release under seal
discharges a debtor (creates privilege in place of duty)-rule of law.
" See, for example, Joy v. St. Louis (189o) 138 U. S. I, 7, 9, 36 and 38, i Sup.
Ct. 243, where a contract and a deed are quoted as follows: "And also the said
party of the first part hath conveyed, assigned, and transferred . . . all
the right, title or interest of the party of the first part of, in or to the right of
way, and of, in or to any and all other rights, privileges and franchises, powers
and immunities, owned by or vested in or enjoyed by the party of the first
part." And again "the parties of the second part are to enter upon and enjoy
the right of way and all the rights, privileges, immunities, powers, improve-
ments, and property belonging to or vested in" etc.
In the case of Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co. v. Green (igi, Ill.) 124 N. E. 298,
the court found it necessary to construe "An act concerning the rights, powers
and duties of certain corporations therein mentioned, authorizing the sale and
transfer of any railroad, or railroad and toll bridge, and other property, fran-
chises, immunities, rights, powers and privileges connected therewith."
'A careful study should be made of Professor Hohfeld's articles entitled
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1913)
23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 16 and (g) 26 ibid., 710. Professor Hohfeld was
professor of law in Yale University from 194 until his untimely death in
October, 1918.
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Rules of law, enabling us to determine the operative effect of facts,
are not discovered by mere analysis; they are discovered rather by a
study of history-by a knowledge of written statutes, of precedents,
and of social mores. The terms and metho& of analysis here presented
are merely to make possible -a greater clearness of mental concept and
a nicer accuracy of expression.
We may now proceed to the more formal definition of the eight
named legal relations, and also of several varieties of rights.
(I) RIGHT: A legal relation between two persons. The correlative
of duty, and the opposite of no-right. An enforceable claim to per-
formance (action or forbearance) by another. It is the legal relation
of A to B when society commands action or forbearance by B and will
at the instance of A in some manner penalize disobedience.
A, knowing that he has a particular right, can answer this question,
"What must another do for me?" (The court will aid me by using
compulsion if he does not do it.)
Examples: (a) B owes A $Ioo.
(b) B has contracted for a consideration to deliver goods to or do
labor for A. In each case A has a right and B has a correlative duty.
(c) A has a right that B shall not strike him, and B has a duty not
to strike.
(2) DUTY: The correlative of the concept right, above defined,
and the opposite of privilege. It is the legal relation of a person, B,
who is commanded by society to act or to forbear for the benefit of
another person, A, either immediately or in the future, and who will
be penalized by society for disobedience.
B, knowing that he has a particular duty, can answer this question,
"What must I do for another ?" (A court will use compulsion against
me if I do not do it.)
Examples: See examples under (I) above.
Rights and duties may be Primary or Secondary, Instant or Future,
Conditional or Unconditional, In rem or In personam, Joint or Several.
(3) PRIVILEGE: The correlative of the legal concept no-right and
the opposite of duty. The legal relation of A to B when A (with
respect to B) is free or at liberty to conduct himself in a certain matter
as he pleases; when his conduct is not regulated for the benefit of
B by the command of society; and when he is not threatened with any
penalty fof disobedience, for the reason that society has made no
command.
A, knowing that he has a particular privilege, can answer this ques-
tion, "What may I do ?" (A court will not prevent me or penalize
me.)
Observe carefully that the concept privilege does not itself include
a right to non-interference by another person, although such a privilege
and such a right very commonly are found together. Being the
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opposite of duty, it is another name for no duty. If I am under no
duty to A, I am with respect to A privileged.
Examples: (a) A assaults B. This gives B the legal privilege of
striking back (commonly called the "right" of self-defence).
(b) B is sworn as a witness. He now has the privilege of saying
words about another person that it was previously his legal duty not
to say. What was previously slander is now a privileged statement.
(c) A neutral in war time has the privilege of shipping contraband
to a belligerent. Other belligerents have no-right that he shall refrain,
but they too are then privileged to seize the contraband. The neutral
is privileged to run, when sighted, but if he disobeys a signal to
heave to, the belligerent is then privileged to sink him.
(4) No-RIGHT: The correlative of privilege, and the opposite of
right. The legal relation of a person (A) in whose behalf society
commands nothing of another (B) A has no control over B. A,
knowing that he has no-right against B, can answer this question,
"What nsay another person (B) do?" (A court will not prevent him
or penalize him.)
Examples: A tells B that he may walk across A's yard. This gives
B a privilege and terminates A's right that B shall not so walk, thus
creating a relation of no-right in A. But B does not have a right, for
A is privileged to lock B out. See also examples under (3) above.
(5) POWER: The correlative of liability, and the opposite of
disability (disability=no power). The legal relation of A to B when
A's own voluntary act will cause new legal relations either between
B and A or between B and a third person.
A, knowing that he has a particular power, can answer this question,
"What new legal relations can I create between B and myself or
others ?"
A sharp distinction must be drawn between legal power and physical
power. Thus a person may have a legal power to make a will even
though he is too weak physically to sign his name; i. e., he has the
legal power but is physically unable to do the volitional act by which
it is to be exercised.
Examples: (a) A's voluntary act of picking up a shell on the sea-
shore creates as against B a right of non-interference with possession.
So A has a power to create such a right against B. (This new right is
a constituent part of that aggregate of legal relations called ownership,
title, or property.)
(b) A having made an offer to B, the latter has the power to create
contractual rights, etc., by accepting.
(c) X writes to A that the latter may sell X's land. A then has a
power to make and accept offers. Distinguish sharply the following:
(I) the physical acts of X; (2) the material document sent to A;
(3) the legal relation of power in A, a mere mental concept.
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(d) A has the legal power, by assaulting B, of creating a secondary
right to damages in B.
Observe that legal power is not always accompanied by legal
privilege; there may be a duty not to use it.
(6) LIABILITY: The correlative of power, and the opposite of im-
munity. (Immunity=no liability.) The relation of A to B when A
may be brought into new legal relations by the voluntary act of B.
A is liable to have new legal relations created for himself through the
exercise by B of B's power. The new relations may be with third
persons, or with B, or with both; but the liability-power relation is
between A and B only.
A, knowing that he has a certain liability, can answer this question,
"What new legal relations can B create between me and himself or
others ?"
Examples: (a) A having made an offer to B, A now has a liability
that B will create contractual relations by accepting (the exercise of
B's power).
(b) A being the owner of Blackacre and having given to B the
power to convey to X, A has a liability of being brought into property
relations with X. Likewise every third person has the same liability
of being brought into property relations with X. B's exercise of his
power, his voluntary act of conveyance, will give X rights against A
and also against all third persons, each of whom will come under cor-
relative duties to X. These duties they cannot avoid; for previously to
B's act of conveyance B has power to create these new relations, and
each third party has the liability to their creation. Such is the law of
property. B's conveyance to X makes him the owner, creating between
him and all other persons those innumerable relations of right,
privilege, power, and immunity of which "property" or "ownership"
consists.6
(c) B having given A a privilege to cross B's land, A has a
liability to the extinguishment of his privilege by revocation, or in
other words, to the creation of a duty not to cross.
Note carefully the distinction between liability and duty, inasmuch
as one of the popular uses of this term is to describe the relation of
duty. It is such double, triple, or quadruple meanings that make terms
slippery, confuse thought, and cause erroneous and unjust decisions.
Hence the necessity of adopting some one specific meaning, as is
attempted here. A owes B $ioo: the legal relation particularly in
mind is a duty to pay. There may no doubt also be a liability to the
creation of new legal relations by a judgment.
Observe that liabilities are not always disadvantageous to the pos-
sessor, although it is the disadvantageous ones with which we are most
often concerned. The correlative power in another person may be
" See definitions 9 and i9, infra, indicating what property relations may be.
12
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(d) A has the legal power, by assaulting , of creating a secondary
right to damages in B.
bserve that legal power is not always accompanied by legal
privilege; there ay be a duty not to use it.
(6) LIABILITY: The correlative of po , and the pposite of i -
unity. (Immunity=no liability.) The relation f A to B hen
ay be brought into ne legal relations y the voluntary act of .
A is liable to have ne legal relations created for hi self through the
exercise by f 's r. he new relations ay be ith third
persons, or ith , r ith both; but the liability-power relation is
bet een and l .
, kno ing t at he has rtain li ilit , s er this sti n,
" hat ne legal relations create bet een e nd i self r
others?"
xa ples: ( ) ing ade n f r t , s a li ility
that ill create tractual l ti s cepting (the rcise f
's po er).
(b) being t e er f I ckacre d ing t
po er to convey t , li ility f i t t rt
.relations ith . ike ise ry t ird s e ilit
of being brought i t r erty r l ti s . ' ise f is
po er, his voluntary act f ce, ,,- t i st
and also against all t ir rs s,
relative duties to . ese ti s t t ; l
's act of conveyance s r t te
each third party as t e li ilit t t i i . f
property. 's conveyance t ti g
hi and all other rs s t i l i
privilege, po er, a i it rty" ip"
c sists.
(c) having i e ri il
liability to the e ti is e t f i
other ords, t t r ti
ote carefully t e isti cti t ility t ,
as one of the popular s s f t i t t
duty. It is such le, tri l , l t
slippery, confuse t t,
ence the necessity f ti i
atte pted here. s 100: t l i
ind is a duty t a . r l a li il t
creation of ne le al r l ti s j t.
bserve that liabilities r t l i t t
sessor, although it is t e isa a ta e s it
often concerned. e c rrelati e r i a t
• definiti s 9 an 1 . ilJfra, indicating hat property relations may be.
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only to create valuable rights, privileges, powers and immunities. Thus
where A's debt to B has been barred by the statute of limitations B
has a liability to the recreation of his right by a voluntary new promise
by A (the exercise of a power by A).
(7) IMMUNITY: The correlative of disability (no power), and the
opposite of liability (no immunity). The relation of A to B when B
has no legal power (has disability) to affect some one or more of the
existing legal relations of A. As to that particular existing relation
A has an immunity with respect.to B.
A, knowing that he has a certain immunity, can answer this question,
"Which one of my existing legal relations is safe from alteration
by B ?"
Examples: (a) A owns Blackacre. His right that B shall not
enter cannot be extinguished by the voluntary act of B; so that with
respect to B, A has immunity. At the same time A may have no such
immunity with respect to C, for the latter may have been given
the power to convey Blackacre to B and thus extinguish A's right
against B.
(b) The Constitution declares that no state shall impair the obligation
of a contract. With respect to state legislatures, therefore, a.con-
tractor has an immunity.
(c) If a citizen of Connecticut has no land, goods, or business in
New York he has an immunity from taxation there. The State of
New York has a disability (no power) to tax in such a case.
(8) DISABILITY: The correlative of immunity, and the opposite of
power. The relation of A to B when by no voluntary act of his own
can A extinguish one (or more) of the existing legal relations of B.
A, knowing that he has a particular disability, can answer this
question, "What existing legal relation of another person (B) is it
impossible for me to extinguish ?"
Examples: See the examples of immunity under (7) above, where B
in the one case and the legislators in the other case have disabilities.
(9) RIGHT in Rem: A right possessed by A against B when it
happens to be one of innumerable similar rights possessed by A against
all (or nearly all) other members of organized society, each one of
whom is under a correlative duty to A (these innumerable duties being
likewise similar). Professor Hohfeld has suggested as a substitute
the term "multital right."
7
Examples: (a) A owns Blackacre. He has a right against B that
B shall not trespass, and similar rights against C, D, X, Y, etc. But
if A has told M that he may walk across, he has no such right
against M.
(b) A has a right that B shall not strike him. He has similar rights
See particularly and at length his article in (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 710.
HeinOnline -- 29 Yale L.J. 171 1919-1920
YALE LAW JOURNAL
only to create valuable rights, privileges, powers and immunities. Thus
where A's debt to B has been barred by the statute of limitations B
has a liability to the recreation of his right by a voluntary new promise
by A (the exercise of a power by A).
(7) IMMUNITY: The correlative of disability (no power), and the
opposite of liability (no immunity). The relation of A to B when B
has no legal power (has disability) to affect some one or more of the
existing- legal relations of A. As to that particular existing relation
A has an immunity with respect.to B.
A, knowing that he has a certain immunity, can answer this question,
"Which one of my existing legal relations is safe fro alteration
by B?"
Examples: (a) A owns Blackacre. His right that B shall not
enter cannot be extinguished by the voluntary act of B; so that ith
respect to B, A has immunity. At the same time A may have no such
immunity with respect to C, for the latter may have been given
the power to convey Blackacre to B and thus extinguish 's right
against B.
(b) The Constitution declares that no state shall impair the obligation
of a contract. With respect to state legislatures, therefore, a. ~
tractor has an immunity.
(c) If a citizen of Connecticut has no land, goods, r si ss i
New York he has an immunity from taxation there. The State f
New York has a disability (no power) to tax in such a case.
(8) DISABILITY: The correlative of immunity, and the site
power. The relation of A to B when by no voluntary act of his
can· A extinguish one (or more) of the existing legal relations f .
A, knowing that he has a particular disability, can ans er t is
question, "What existing legal relation of another person ( ) is it
impossible for me to extinguish?"
Examples: See the examples of immunity under (7) above, here
in the one case and the legislators in the other case have disabilities.
(9) RIGHT in Rem: A right possessed by against e it
happens to be one of innumerable similar rights possessed by A against
all (or nearly all) other members of organized society, each f
whom is under a correlative duty to A (these innumerable duties being
likewise similar). Professor Hohfeld has suggested as a substitute
the term "multital right."7
Examples: (a) A owns Blackacre. He has a right against that
B shall not trespass, and similar rights against C, D, , , etc. ut
if A has told M that he may walk across, he has no such right
against M.
(b) A has a right that B shall not strike him. e has similar rights
7 See particularly and at length his article in (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 710.
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against C, D, X, Y, etc. But if A is M's minor son, and has disobeyed,
he has no such right against M.
(c) A patentee has a right that B shall not manufacture or sell, and
similar rights against C, D, X, Y, etc. But he may have licensed M
to manufacture and sell.
Observe that a right in rem is not a right in a thing or a right against
a thing. Legal relations are relations between persons.
Observe also that a right in rem is not a right against the world or
against all other persons.
The term "right in rei" is commonly used to include other legal
relations in rem, viz., relations of privilege, power, and immunity.
This must be avoided.
(Io) RIGHT in Personam: A right possessed by A against B,
unaccompanied by similar rights against all (or nearly all) others.
It may be accompanied by similar rights against certain specific other
persons. If it is totally unaccompanied, Professor Hohfeld calls it a
"unital" right; and if accompanied by similar rights against several
specific persons, he calls it a "paucital" right."
Examples: (a) A holds B's promissory note for $ioo. A's right
against B is unaccompanied or "unital."
(b) B strikes A without justification. A has a right to damages
from B, a secondary right, unaccompanied or "unital."
(c) A holds the joint or joint and several promissory note of B, C,
and D, for $ioo. A's right against B is not in rem; it is a "paucital"
right. ie has exactly similar rights against C and D.
(ii) PRIMARY RIGHT: A right resulting from some operative fact
that was not itself a violation of some precedent right. Primary rights
may be either in rem or in personam, either multital or paucital or
unital.
(12) SECONDARY RIGHT: A right resulting from some operative
fact that was a violation of some precedent right. So-called
"remedial" rights are always secondary. Secondary rights are always
in personam, paucital or unital.
(13) MULTITAL RIGHT: See RIGHT in ren, No. 9.
(14) PAUCITAL RIGHT: See RIGHT in personam, No. IO.
(15) UNITAL RIGHT: See RIGHT in personam, No. IO.
Observe that privileges, powers, immunities, duties, no-rights, dis-
abilities, and liabilities, as well as rights; may all conceivably be
multital, paucital, or unital.
(16) INSTANT AND FUTURE RIGHTS: The right of A may be that
B shall act in a certain way at once, instantly, or that B shall so act
at some future date. If it is the latter, we say that A has a right to
future action by B. Such a right is not called a conditional right,
'See (1917) 26 ibid., 710.
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against C, D, X, Y, etc. But if A is M's minor son, and has disobeyed.
he has no such right against M.
(c) A patentee has a right that B shall not manufacture or se l, and
similar rights against C, D, X, Y, etc. But he may have licensed
to manufacture and sell.
Observe that a right in rem is not a right in a thing or a right against
a thing. Legal relations are relations betw en persons.
Observe also that a right in re is not a right against the world or
against all other persons.
The term "right in rem" is co only used to include other legal
relations in re , viz., relations of privil , po and im ~mi
This ust be avoided.
(10) RI HT in Persona : right ossessed by against ,
unacco panied by si ilar rights against ll (or nearly a l) others.
It may be acco panied by si ilar rights against certain specifi other
persons. If it is totally unacco panied, Professor feld lls it
" ital" right; and if cco panied by si ilar rights against eral
sp;cific persons, e alls it "paucital" ri t.8
Exa ples: (a) holds 's r issory te 100. ' right
.against B is unacco panied r ital."
(b) B strikes ithout justification. s right s
from B, a secondary right, acc anied r ital."
(c) A holds the joint or joint a se eral r i s ry t f ,
and , for $100. 's ri t i t t i ital"
right. He has exactly si ilar ri ts i t .
(I I) PRI ARY I : ri t lti t
that was not itself a violation f t .
may be either in re or in ers , it r t l r
unital.
(12) SECONDARY I : ri t r lti
fact that as a violation f t
"re edial" ri ts are l s r .
in personam, paucital r it l.
(13) ULTITAL I : m, O. .
(14) PAUCITAL I : ee I i rsonam, 10.
(IS) UNITAL I : ee I i nam, 10
Observe that privileges, po ers, i iti s, ti , - i
abilities, and liabilities, s ll
ultital, paucital, r it l.
(16) INSTANT AND F I : ri
B shall act in a certain ay at , i t tl , r t s ll so
.at some future date. If it is t latter, s t has t
future action by . uch a ri t is not c ll a conditional right,
• See (1917) 26 ibid., 710.
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even though the arrival of the date is a necessary operative fact, for
the reason that it is certain to occur.
Example: A holds B's promissory note for $ioo payable on June I
next. On June I A's right to future payment becomes an instant right.
(17) CONDITIONAL RIGHT: This is a right to a future performance
that does not become instant by the mere arrival of a date, but becomes
so only upon the occurrence of some uncertain operative fact. The
creation of an instant right often requires the occurrence of several
operative facts. If some of these have occurred but one has not,
that one is a condition precedent to the existence of an instant right.
Prior to the occurrence of this one fact we often describe the legal
relations as a conditional right and a conditional duty.
Examples: (a) A pays B $ioo and B promises to deliver a bale of
goods on their arrival aboard the ship Peerless. This is a unilateral
contract, and A has a conditional right.
(b) For a premium of $ o paid, an insurer agrees to pay A $io,ooo
if a house burns down.
(c) A agrees to work for B for $ioo a week payable weekly. Here
the completion of a week's work is a condition precedent to A's instant
right. Meanwhile A has a conditional right; he may also be said to
have a power, in case the condition is mere voluntary action by himself.
The term unconditional right includes all instant rights and also all
rights to future performance that depend on no fact other than the
passage of timeY
There is no need to discuss here such terms as "divine right" and
"absolute right." They have no proper place in a system of human
justice.
(18) JOINT RIGHT: A right may be a "joint" right either because
there are (a) several obligees or (b) several obligors.
(a) If X gives his promissory note to A and B jointly, legal relations
are created between A and X and between B and X (as well as between
A and B). A has a right that X shall pay either A or B, and B has
an exactly similar right against X. The character of these relations
is not in the least affected by the rule that A's secondary right to a
judgment is conditional upon B's joining as plaintiff.
Observe that A's right against X is not a "paucital" right; it is
unital, inasmuch as he has no similar right against any other person.
Observe also that the relations between A and X are distinct from those
between B and X. A and B are independent persons. They are not
"one," even in "the eye of the law."
(b) If X and Y give their joint promissory note to A, he has two
rights, one against X and an exactly similar one against Y, that the
full sum shall be paid at maturity. In this case each of A's rights is
' See discussion of Conditions in the Law of Contract (igig) 28 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 739; Anson on Contract (Corbin's ed. 1919) secs. 355-400.
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even though the arrival of the date is a necessar operati 2 fact, for
the reason that it is certain to occur.
Example: A holds B's promissory note for $100 payable on June 1
next. On June 1 's right to future pay ent beco es an i sta t ri t.
(17) CONDITIONAL RIGHT: This is a right to a future perfor ance
that does not beco e instant by the ere arrival 9f a t , t be
so only upon the occurrence of s e uncertai oper ti fact.
creation of an instant right often requires the occ rr of r l
operative facts. If so e of these have occ rre t on has t,
that one is a condition precedent to the existence f a i st t ri t.
Prior to the occurrence of this one fact e often descri e t l l
relations as a conditional right and a c iti al t .
Exa ples: (a) pays $100 and r ises t deli r a l
goods on their arrival aboard t e s i eerless. i i il t l
contract, and has a conditional ri t.
(b) For a pre iu of $50 ai , i s r r r t 10,000
if a house r s .
(c) agrees to ork f r f r 100 l l .
the co pletion of a eek's r is iti r t t '
right. ean hile has a conditional ri t; l i
have a power, in case the condition is ere voluntary action i self.
The ter unconditional right includes all i sta t ri ts l ll
rights to future perfor ance that depend on fact t r t t
passage f ti e.9
There is no need to discuss here s c ter s s i i ri t
"absolute right." They have no proper place in a syste f
j stice.
(18) J I T I T: right ay e a "j i t" ri t it r
there are ( ) se eral li s ) l
(a) If gives his r iss r t t j i tl , i s
are created bet een a a t s ll en
and ). has a right t at s ll it r ,
an e.xactly si ilar right against . r ter t
is not in the least affected by t e r le t t 's r i t t
judg ent is conditional 's j i i l i ti .
bserve that 's ri t i st i t ital"
unital, inas uch as he has no si ilar ri t i st t r .
bserve als t at t r l ti ns t een t se
bet een and . and are i e e dent r . ey t
"one," even in "the eye of the la ."
(b) If and give their joint r issory te t , e t
rights, one against and an exactly si ilar i st , t t t e
full su shall be ai t at rit . I t i f ' ts
• See discussion of onditions i1~ the f tr t (1919) LE
JOURNAL, 739; A1~son on Contract ( orbin's ~d. 1919) sees. 355-400.
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a "paucital" right. Here, too, A's secondary right to a judgment is
conditional upon his joining both as co-defendants; or, at least either
X or Y when sued alone would have the power of depriving A of his
right to a judgment by pleading in abatement.
In the above illustration it should be noted that the right to payment
is quite different from the right to judgment. The first is against a
party; the second is against the court.
(19) LEGAL INTEREST: The aggregate of the legal relations of a
person with respect to some specific physical object or the physical
relations of specific objects.
Examples: (a) A owns Blackacre. He has a legal interest, con-
sisting of various rights, privileges, powers, and immunities. Here
his interest is "property." (The term property is often used to denote
physical objects. Such use should be carefully distinguished.)
(b) A has contracted with B to employ B and to pay salary. A
has here an interest consisting of contract rights, powers, etc., against
B, and certain multital rights, powers, etc., against all other persons.'
0
Because of A's multital rights, powers, etc., his interest is here also
sometimes described as "property."
(c) A has a legal interest in the physical safety of his wife, multital
rights that she shall not be harmed, her affections alienated, etc.
Distinguish sharply between "legal interest" and the physical objects
themselves with respect to which and for the enjoyment of which the
legal relations are created.
Distinguish also between "legal interest" and that sort of "interest"
that consists merely of an emotion or a state of mind.
Distinguish further the kind of "interest" that is a return or com-
pensation for money loaned; the rate fixed by contract or by law is
sometimes referred to as "legal interest."
"Lumley v. Gye (1853, Q. B.) 2 El. & BI. 216.
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a "paucital" right. ere, too, 's secondary right to a judgment is
conditional upon his joining both as co-def t!>; or, at least either
X or Y when sued alone would have the power of depriving of his
right to a judgment by pleading in abate ent.
In the above illustration it should be noted that the right to payment
is quite different fro the right to judgment. The first is against a
party; the second is against the court.
(19) LEGAL I TEREST: The aggregate of the legal relations f a
person ith respect to so e specific hysical object or the ysical
relations f s cific j cts.
xa ples: (a) o ns lackacre. e has l al interest, con-
sisting of various ri ts, rivileges, po ers, d i unities. re
his interest is "property." (The ter t is ten used to te
physical objects. uch se s ould e carefu ly istinguished.)
(b) has c tracted it t l to ay l r .
has here an interest c sisting f tract rights, o ers, tc., ainst
, and certain ultital ri ts, rs, t ., i st ll t r rs s.10
ecause of 's ultital ri ts, r , tc., is t r st i re
so eti es described as " r rty."
(c) has a le al i t r st i t e i al f ty f i , it l
rights that she s all t r , r i t ,
istinguish s ar l t en l al t" i l t
the selves ith res ect t i j ent f
legal relations are r t .
istinguish als t l al t" t rt st"
t at c sists r l f t
istinguish f rt er t i t"
pensation for e l ; t t
s eti es r f rr t l .
'0 Lumley v. Gye (1853, Q. B.) 2 EI. & BI. 216.
